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PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE SPEECH-FREEDOM

To

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the Pennsylvania Constitution
PETITION-PRIVATE PROPERTY-SHOPPING CENTERS-The

does not guarantee a right of access to, or political expression
upon, privately owned property held open to the public when the
owner has prohibited such activity by a uniform exclusionary policy against political solicitation to prevent its use as a public
forum.
Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers Party 1982 Campaign v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Pa. -,
515
A.2d 1331 (1986).
During the early spring of 1982, members of the Socialist Workers Party conducted a solicitation drive to obtain signatures of registered Pennsylvania voters on a nominating petition for their gubernatorial candidate, Mark Zola.' Three members of the Workers
Party sought permission to solicit signatures inside the South Hills
Village shopping center.2 South Hills Village is a large indoor shopping mall located in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, a suburban Pittsburgh community.3 The mall houses roughly 126 businesses and is
surrounded by a parking lot that can accommodate up to 5,000
cars." The request of the party members to solicit signatures was
denied by the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company,
owner of the mall.6 As justification for their position, the owners
pointed to their uniform policy against political solicitation of any
kind on mall property.' Rather than face the possibility of arrest
for defiant trespass, the party members sought relief in the courts.7
1. Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., Pa.
515 A.2d 1331 (1986)(hereinafter cited as Socialist Workers).
2. The party members, also named as appellants in Socialist Workers, were: Linda
Nordquist, a registered Socialist Workers Party voter, Francis Farley, chairperson of the
campaign committee and Mark Zola, then gubernatorial candidate and party member. See
Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super.
493, 485 A.2d 1,2 (1984).
3. 515 A.2d 1331, 1333.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Connecticut General acquired ownership of the mall in March of 1982. The prior
owners were alleged to have also maintained the same uniform exclusionary policy against
political solicitation. Brief for Appellee at 3-4.
7. 515 A.2d at 1333. See generally 18 PA. C.S. § 3503 (Criminal Trespass).
-,
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On May 11, 1982, the Socialist Workers Party filed a complaint
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking equitable relief to enjoin Connecticut General from enforcing its nosolicitation policy.' The Workers Party claimed that such a ban
was violative of their rights of free speech and petition under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.' A hearing to consider issuance of a
preliminary injunction was held on May 17 before then Judge
Nicholas P. Papadakos, now a Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.' ° On May 28, Judge Papadakos entered a decree nisi
denying injunctive relief." Exceptions taken at trial were denied
by the court en banc on October 21, 1982.12
An appeal was taken to the superior court. At issue was whether
or not the Declaration of Rights contained in the Pennsylvania
Constitution conferred upon the Socialist Workers Party a right of
access to privately owned property held open to the public despite
the owner's policy against allowing political solicitation. 3 In a decision written by Judge Wieand, the superior court concluded it
did not. " The superior court reached this result based upon its
interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. Tate. 8 Thus, the refusal of the trial court to
grant the injunction was upheld and a motion for a rehearing was
later denied. 6
On June 7, 1985, the court granted a petition of allocatur for
8. 515 A.2d 1331, 1333 See also Brief for Appellee at 2.
9. 515 A.2d at 1332. The appellants claimed no rights under the Constitution of the
United States, conceding that its provisions had been uniformly interpreted to place a limitation upon state as opposed to private action. Id. at 1332 n.1. See also Brief for Appellant
at 12 n.7.
10. 515 A.2d at 1333.

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Western Pennsylvania Socialist Party v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa.
Super. 493, 485 A.2d 1, 2 (1984).
14. Id.
15. Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981). In an opinion written
by Justice Roberts, the court recognized that a state is free to use its constitution as a basis
to extend rights and liberties to its citizens which are broader than those of the federal Bill
of Rights. Id. at 1387. The court also recognized that the right to own and possess property
was not absolute and could be the appropriate subject of state regulation. Id. at 1389. The
court noted that the California Supreme Court had already decided that free speech and
petition were rights worthy of protection by an exercise of the state's police power to the
same extent that health and safety, the environment, and other goals could be protected by
imposing restrictions on private property rights. Id., See generally Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74
(1980), see infra notes 78 & 81.
16. Brief for Appellee at 3, Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986).
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leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 17 The scope
of the appeal was limited to considering whether sections 2, 7 and
20 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution conferred upon the
petitioners any enforceable rights against the owners of South
Hills Village."8 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded
those sections did not and upheld the decision of the lower court.1 "
In a plurality opinion written by Justice Hutchinson, who
neither participated in the decision or the consideration of the
case, the court concluded that the Pennsylvania Constitution imposed a limitation upon government only and did not reach private
action.2 0 The court reasoned that although the rights enumerated
in the Declaration of Rights were inherent in the nature of man,
such enumerated rights were preserved only against infringement
by the state.2 The court concluded that a resolution of conflict
between private citizens was a matter best left to civil law.2 2 Not
all private disputes, reasoned the court, raised questions of constitutional dimensions.2 3 The court determined that it would be unwise to restrict the development of civil law by affording any one
party's particular position24 the protection of the constitution.
Thus, in Pennsylvania, a private property owner who uniformly
prohibits the expression of any political activity on his property so
as to prevent it from becoming a public forum may do so without
raising questions of constitutional magnitude. The state constitution will not be used in the name of individual liberty2 5 to adjust
17. Id.
18. Article I, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads: "All power is inherent
in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for
their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends they have at all times
an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such
manner as they may think proper." PA CONST. art. I, §2. Section 7 of article I reads in
pertinent part: "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that liberty." PA. CONST. art. I, §7. Section 20 of Article I reads:
"The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble together for their common
good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances
or other proper purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance." PA. CONST. art. I, §20.
19. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1333, 1339.
20. Id. at 1335.
21. Id. Article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution reads: "All men are born
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness." PA. CONST. art. I, §1.
22. 515 A.2d at 1335-36.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1339.
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competing private interests. The court reasoned that to permit this
would bring about increased governmental intervention in private
affairs."6
Both Justices Larsen and Zappala filed separate concurring
opinions agreeing with the result." Justice Larsen reasoned that
the rights of a property owner must remain free from outside interference by private parties. 8 For the same reason he dissented in
Tate, Justice Larsen concluded that judicially created exceptions,
or a resort to constitutional balancing of private interests, would
create confusion and uncertainty for property owners. 9
Justice Zappala questioned the wisdom of the court's decision in
Tate but found it unnecessary to consider that decision with respect to the principal case since no criminal prosecution for trespass on private property was involved.3 0 Justice Zappala agreed
with the plurality to the extent that the state constitution existed
only as a limitation upon governmental power and that the civil
law was the proper forum for resolution of private disputes.3 ' In
his view, when the position of any private party required greater
protection than that already available in the civil law, it was for
the legislature to define the scope of that protection.32 Because
there was no legislative authority to permit the Socialist Workers
Party to solicit signatures upon private property and also because
there was no principle of common law which would elevate the
rights of free speech and solicitation above the rights of a property
owner, Justice Zappala concluded that there was no foundation
33
upon which injunctive relief could possibly issue.
Justice McDermott concurred only in the result.3 4 He rejected
the reasoning of Tate and the application of the constitution to a
case such as this.35 In his opinion, the owners of the mall were
merchants engaged in business and were under no obligation to
provide the public with a forum in which to express their views.3 "
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1340.
28. Id.
29. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (1981)(Larsen, J., dissenting).
30. 515 A.2d at 1340.
31. Id.
32. Id. Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1945)(Reed, J., dissenting). See infra
note 48.
33. 515 A.2d at1341.
34. Id. at 1341 & n.1.
35. Id.
36. We should not lose sight of the fact that persons who own and operate shop-
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Chief Justice Nix both concurred and dissented. 7 His concurrence was limited, however, only up to the point at which the plurality opinion held that the constitution recognized the existence
of rights which were inherent in the nature of man.3 8 At that point

Chief Justice Nix diverged from the reasoning expressed by the
court. In his view, the violation of any of these inherent rights,
even when not the result of state action, was a question of constitutional magnitude.39 Under the rationale of Tate, Chief Justice

Nix endorsed a balancing approach which would seek to maximize
the enjoyment of competing private interests.40 He recognized that
a modern shopping center was comparable to the central commercial area of a community, a place which has traditionally enjoyed
the status of a public forum." Chief Justice Nix did not think that
the fact property was privately owned should be dispositive in a
case such as this.2
The balancing approach advocated by Chief Justice Nix has also
been used by the Supreme Court of the United States in resolving
similar conflicts between first amendment freedoms and the rights
of a property owner. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, the Court addressed the problem of
whether the owner of a shopping center and one of his lessees
could obtain an injunction to prevent union members from picketing a business establishment located in the shopping center. 43 The
ping malls are merchants. As such they should not be required to provide forum,
place, or occasion for speech making, petition signing, parades, or cracker barrels, to
discuss local or global events. They are in business for business sake. They are not
municipalities, states, or villages, and however romantic it may be to believe that the
public repair to these galvanic places, of a Saturday morning, for more than bread
and salt, they are not yet instruments of the state.
Id. (McDermott, J., concurring).
37. 515 A.2d at 1341.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1341-42.
40. Id. at 1342.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968). In Logan Valley, respondent Logan was the owner of a shopping center
known as the Logan Valley Mall located near Altoona, Pa. Id. at 310. The other respondent,
Weis Market Inc., operated a supermarket in space it leased from the mall. Id. Weis opened
for operation in December of 1965 and employed an entirely non-union staff. Id. at 311.
That same month, Local 590 began peacefully picketing in the loading area in front of the
supermarket and in its parking lot. None of the pickets included any of Weis' employees. Id.
at 311-12.
On December 27, 1965, both Logan and Weis sought an ex parte injunction to enjoin the
Local from picketing. That injunction was issued by the Court of Common Pleas of Blair
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court had upheld an earlier grant of an injunction by a lower court because, in its view, the continued presence of union picketers against the wishes of a private property
owner constituted a trespass." Although the petitioners had
claimed that the first amendment entitled them to picket on shopping center property, the trial court rejected their argument.4 5
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed."6 The
Court began its analysis with the proposition that picketing carried
on in an area generally held open to the public was protected by
the first amendment. 4 7 The Court reasoned that shopping center
property was the functional equivalent of a "business block," or
commercial area, which was considered earlier in the case of Marsh
v. Alabama.' Furthermore, the Court found that the Logan Valley
County and was later continued indefinitely after an evidentary hearing. Id. at 312.
44. Id. at 313.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 309.
47. Id. at 313.
48. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945). In Marsh, the Court had occasion to consider whether the management of a corporation could deny the residents of Chickasaw, Alabama their first amendment rights solely on the ground that Chickasaw was a company
owned town.
The concept of a company town was one that developed after the Civil War in the South.
Id. at 508 & n.5. See also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 561-62 (1972). In order to
attract a labor force, workers were often given food and shelter on company owned property
in return for their toils. In this case, the Gulf Shipbuilding Company owned the entire town
of Chickasaw. Id. 326 U.S. at 502. The town consisted of residential buildings, streets, sewers and a commercial area or "business block." Id. Nothing demarcated the property which
comprised the town from any other property surrounding it . Id. at 503. Members of the
general public could just as easily drive through Chickasaw's streets and shop in its stores as
any other resident of the town. Id. Except for the fact that title in all of the town's property
was vested in Gulf, the Court found nothing which would distinguish Chickasaw from any
other town in America. Id. at 508.
The appellant was a Jehovah's Witness who was arrested for continuing to distribute religious literature outside the town's post office after she had been asked to leave. Id. at 503.
She was charged with trespass under the Alabama Criminal Code and convicted. Id. at 50304. The Alabama Supreme Court denied her petition of certiorari and she appealed directly
to the Supreme Court of the United States claiming that her arrest was a violation of both
the freedoms of religion and of the press as guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution. Id. at 503. The Supreme Court reversed her conviction.
In an opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, the Court concluded that the management of
Gulf could not limit liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. A private property owner,
such as Gulf, who would employ the use of a state statute to enforce such a restriction, was
held to have violated rights guaranteed by both the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at
508.
The Court reasoned that Chickasaw was the functional equivalent of a town. For all practical purposes, the management of Gulf stood in the shoes of the state by providing public
services just as any other municipality would. The Court distinguished the corporation's
alleged right to control the residents of Chickasaw from the right of a private homeowner to
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Mall property, while privately owned, was nevertheless held open
to the public."' The Court concluded that Pennsylvania could not
constitutionally use its trespass laws to prevent the public from
engaging in first amendment activities on property so long as those
activities were related to the manner in which the property was
being used.50
The Court also noted that the laws of Pennsylvania may give
private property owners some rights to limit the use of their property. 1 The Court recognized that a property owner could make
reasonable regulations to limit expression, as could the state under
certain circumstances.5 2 There was no need to consider the scope
of possible regulation here, however, since Pennsylvania had ruled
that first amendment freedoms such as picketing could be prohibited absolutely.53 Justice Black, who authored the decision in
Marsh, upon which the majority opinion relied, dissented.5 4
control the conduct of his guests. Id. at 505-08. The Court held that the public had an
interest in expecting the channels of communication to remain free and that the first
amendment was at the foundation of a free society. Hence, any constitutional balance must
result in favor of the appellant. Id. at 507-09.
In dicta, the Court stated that "[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. As
the owner opens up his property to the public, for his advantage, his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and Constitutional rights of those who use it." Id. at 506. This idea
is often referred to in support of the public function doctrine. See infra note 121.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that title to property controlled
property relations only, not civil liberties. Id. 407 U.S. at 511.
Mr. Justice Reed dissented. In his view, freedom of speech and of the press were not
absolute rights. He criticized the Court for opening the possibility that one could exercise
these rights in a manner contrary to the wishes of a private property owner. Id at 512.
Although "[tihe restrictions imposed by the owners upon the occupants are sometimes galling to the employees and may appear unreasonable to outsiders, [uinless they fall under the
prohibition of some legal rule . . . they are a matter for adjustment between owner and
licensee, or by appropriate legislation." Id. at 513. "The right of the owner, which the Constitution protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of
the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech." Id. at 516.
49. Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 319.
50. Id. at 319 & n.9. In this case, all of the picketing activity was related to the manner in which the Weis Market was being operated, i.e., the employment of non-union labor.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 320. See also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (access to public property for purposes of exercising first amendment freedoms can be denied when the property
is not open to the public); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (statute prohibiting
picketing that would interfere with free egress or access to a county courthouse upheld); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (statute prohibiting picketing in or near a court so as to
result in interference with the administration of justice upheld); and Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1965) (government may regulate the use of private property when
necessary for public health, safety or morals through an exercise of zoning laws).
53. 391 U.S. at 321.
54. Id. Justice Black reasoned that Marsh was never intended to apply in a situation
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Four years after its decision, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on the question it declined to address in Logan Valley. That issue focused on the permissible scope of regulations that
a private property owner could impose upon a citizen's exercise of
first amendment rights. In Lloyd Corp v. Tanner, the respondent
sought to distribute handbills protesting the Vietnam war inside
the Lloyd Center shopping complex.15 The owner of the complex
had a general prohibition against the use of mall property for political purposes and also maintained a strict policy against the distribution of handbills. 5 ' Subsequent to a complaint by a mall customer, the respondent was asked to leave by mall security officers
or face the prospect of arrest by the police. 57 The respondent left
the premises but later sought an injunction in the federal District
Court of Oregon to enjoin Lloyd from enforcing its prohibition. 8
The district court issued the injunction upon concluding that the
mall was the functional equivalent of a business district and that
the mall owner's regulation prohibiting the distribution of handbills inside the mall was in violation of the respondent's first
amendment rights." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in reliance upon the earlier decisions of Marsh and Logan Valley,
upheld the district court. 60 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that first amendment guarantees had no application here since the mall property was not sufficiently dedicated to
public use."'
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court found the
facts in Lloyd were sufficient to distinguish it from Logan Valley. 2
Unlike Logan Valley, where picketing was directed at a business
establishment located in the shopping center, the distribution of
such as Logan Valley. Id at 330. In his view Marsh addressed the more limited question of
when it was appropriate to treat private property as if it were public. Id. at 332. Marsh
stood only for the proposition that when privately owned property took on all the attributes
of a town could this result ever be reached. Id. (Emphasis added.) The Logan Valley Mall,
although it resembled a business district, was not a town. Although the union picketers may
have had a constitutional right to air their views, the Constitution did not require the Weis
Market to provide them with the use of its own property to do so. Id. at 332-33.
55. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). The Lloyd Center complex, located in
Portland, Oregon, was a shopping mall owned by the Lloyd Corporation, Ltd.
56. Id. at 555.
57. Id. at 556.
58. Id. at 552, 556.
59. Id. at 552, 556.
60. Id. at 556-57.
61. Id. at 570.
62. Id. at 563-64.
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handbills at the Lloyd Center had no association with any activity
carried on inside the mall or related to it.63 Furthermore, to have
denied the union members in Logan Valley an opportunity to
picket on mall property would have deprived them of any reasonable opportunity to communicate their views. 4 Here, an alternate
forum for communication was readily available since the respondents could easily have distributed their handbills from public
streets or sidewalks. 5
The Court then reasoned that even though the private property
involved in Lloyd was held open to the public, this did not mean it
would necessarily lose its private character. 6 The Court found that
the invitation to the public to enter upon mall property did not
extend beyond one limited to engaging in commercial activity. 7
The Court noted that its decision was in keeping with the principle
that even public property could be regulated in such a manner as
to restrict the exercise of first amendment freedoms when
necessary.6
In rejecting the argument that Lloyd Center had become the
functional equivalent of a "business block," the Court held that
the respondent's reliance on Marsh v. Alabama was misplaced. 9
For all practical purposes, the corporate owner in Marsh stood in
the shoes of the state. 70 The court pointed to the fact that, unlike a
shopping center, the company-owned town considered in Marsh
7
had taken on all of the attributes of a municipality. '
Four Justices in Lloyd joined in a dissenting opinion. 2 In their
view, because the Lloyd Center had already been found to have
voluntarily opened itself to some forms of public expression, it
could not now seek to bar the type of activity in which the respondents sought to engage. 3 In balancing the freedom of speech
63. Id. at 564.
64. Id. at 566.
65. Id. at 557.
66. Id. at 569.
67. Id. at 564-65.
68. Id. at 568. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
69. 407 U.S. at 556-64. See supra note 48.
70. 407 U.S. at 569.
71. Id. at 569 & n.13.
72. Id. at 570 (5-4 decision) (Justices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan and Stewart dissented in the result).
73. The Lloyd Center Complex had permitted the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of
America and the American Legion to solicit funds at the mall. High schools had conducted
football rallies there, presidential candidates had given speeches and other service organizations had conducted Veteran's Day ceremonies. Id. at 577-79.
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against the right of a property owner to control the use of his property, the dissenting justices in Lloyd would tip the scales in favor
of speech. 4
The decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner was an implicit rejection
of the reasoning used in Logan Valley. Even if Logan Valley had
been the controlling Supreme Court decision at the time Socialist
Workers was decided, it is doubtful the outcome in the case would
have been any different. Aside from the reasoning expressed in the
dissenting opinion in Lloyd, it is difficult to imagine how a court
would be persuaded that the solicitation of signatures on a nominating petition was related to the use of South Hills Village as a
shopping center under the rationale expressed in Logan Valley.
In Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court made it clear that Logan Valley
had been incorrectly decided and had been overruled by Lloyd. 5
In Hudgens, the Court relied heavily on language used in Lloyd
which emphasized that the first and fourteenth amendments were
a restriction only upon state action taken by government and had
no bearing on the acts of a private property owner." The Court did
leave open the possibility that in some cases, the common or statutory law of a state may provide an avenue for redress against private parties who sought to abridge the constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms of other private individuals." The state of California
thereupon seized this opportunity to interpret its own state constitution to provide a remedy for these abuses.
In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, the Supreme Court of
California held that a reasonable exercise of the freedom of speech
and petitioning by private citizens inside a privately owned shopping center, was an activity protected by the California Constitution.78 California case law had previously recognized that all pri74. Id. at 580.
75. Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976). In Hudgens, the Court rejected the
assertion by a labor union that it had a constitutionally protected first amendment right to
picket a store located inside a privately owned shopping mall. Id. at 521.
76. Id. at 518-19. See also Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. at 567-70.
77. 424 U.S. at 513.
78. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In Pruneyard,a group of high school students set
up a cardtable in a corner of the mall's main courtyard and attempted to solicit signatures
on a petition against a United Nation's resolution condemning Zionism. Id. 592 P.2d at 342.
The students were eventually approached by a mall security officer who informed them that
because they had not sought the permission of the mall's owner to solicit signatures, their
conduct violated the mall's regulations. Id. It was suggested that they leave the courtyard
area and solicit elsewhere. Id. The students left the premises but later filed suit to have
Pruneyard enjoined from denying them access to mall property. Id.
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vate property was held subject to the sovereign authority of the
state to regulate its use for the public welfare. 9 The California
court, after reflecting upon the growing importance of the shopping
center as a part of everyday life in America, was of the opinion
that individual interests must sometimes be held subordinate to
the needs of a changing society.80 The court then reasoned that the
need to protect free speech and petitioning was equally as important as the need to protect the health and safety of the public, and
was a proper subject of state regulation.8 1 Any other result, said
the court, would make the state's interest in securing the first
amendment freedoms of its citizens secondary to the desires of a
private property owner.8 2 After reviewing the decisions in Lloyd
and Hudgens, along with prior California case law, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that, at least with respect to shopping centers, free speech and petitioning were rights protected
under Sections 2 and 3 of Article I of the California Constitution. 3
In a subsequent appeal by the owners of the Pruneyard Center,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed. 4 The Court reasoned
there was nothing to prevent a state from exercising its authority
to interpret its constitution so as to provide its citizens with more
expansive individual liberties than the minimum already guaranteed by the federal Bill of Rights.8 5 Such an exercise of state power
is limited, of course, to actions that do not contravene any other
federal constitutional provisions." In holding that the California
79. Id. 592 P.2d at 344, quoting Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16
Cal.3d 392, 403, 546 P.2d 687, 694, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183, 190 (1976).
80. Id. 592 P.2d at 345.
81. The California Supreme Court reasoned that "[t]o protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely matches the protecting of health and safety, the environment,
aesthetics, property values and other societal goals that have been held to justify reasonable
restrictions on private property rights." Id. at 346.
82. Id. at 344.
83. Id. at 347. Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution reads: "Every person
may freely speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of this right. A law many not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2. This language is strikingly similar to that contained in section 7,
article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See supra note 18. See also CAL. CONST., art. I, §
3 which provides in part that "the people have the right to ....
petition the government
for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to consult for the common good."
84. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. 74 (1974).
85. Id. at 79. See also Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (state
courts should be left free to interpret their own constitutions); and Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983) (Supreme Court will not review decisions of a state court's interpretation of its own constitution so long as there appears to be adequate and independent state
grounds for the state court's conclusions).
86. 447 U.S. at 81.
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decision did not result in a taking of private property for public
use, which would run contrary to the fifth amendment, the Supreme Court found nothing to indicate there had been an impairment of either the value or the use of the property as a shopping
center.8 7 The Court also took recognition of the fact that the Supreme Court of California had conceded the owner could adopt
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in order to minimize any interference with the mall's commercial activities."8
Since Pruneyard was decided, eight other states have considered
the issue of free speech and its meaning within the context of a
privately-owned shopping center. At this time, they are almost
evenly divided as to whether they will resort to their state constitutions in order to resolve the problem. Massachusetts, Washington and New Jersey have indicated they will go along with California's lead and hold that expressive activity on private property is
constitutionally protected under some circumstances.8 9 In doing so,
these states have expanded the reach of their constitutions to
touch upon what would otherwise be purely private conduct. They
have also concluded that the concept of state action is not a necessary prerequisite to invoking state constitutional scriptures.9 0 New
Jersey and Washington have been careful to point out, however,
that elimination of the state action requirement does not mean
constitutional provisions will always apply to all forms of expres87. Id. at 82-83.
88. Id. at 83-84. For a recent California decision concerning the scope of permissible
regulations and the propriety of issuing an injunction to enjoin expressional conduct see
Horton Plaza v. Playing for Real Theater, - Cal.App.3d -,
228 Cal.Rptr. 817 (1986).
89. In Adlerwood Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d
108 (1981) the petitioner, an environmental activist group, sought permission from the owners of the Alderwood Shopping Center to solicit signatures inside the mall in support of
Initiative 383, the Radioactive Waste Storage and Transportation Act of 1980. Their request
was denied. Believing that the mall owner's refusal was unconstitutional, they went ahead
and solicited signatures in an otherwise unobtrusive fashion. The owner in turn obtained a
temporary restraining order to enjoin any such further activity. Id. 635 P.2d at 110. The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that the environmentalist's activities were protected
under the free speech and initiative provisions of the Washington Constitution despite the
absence of state action. Id. at 115-16.
In a factual setting similar to Socialist Workers, the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Batchleder v. Allied Stores Int'l., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983), held that the right of
a political candidate to solicit signatures on a nominating petition inside a privately owned
shopping center was protected under article 9 of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. 445
N.E.2d at 591. The court held that article 9, the free election provision, did not contain any
requirement which limited its applicability to government action alone. Id. at 593.
90. See, Alderwood Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash.2d 230, 635
P.2d 108, 114, 116 (1981), Batchleder v. Allied Stores Int'l., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590,
593 (1983), State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 628, 639 (1980).
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sive conduct under all circumstances.91

To be sure, abandonment of the state action doctrine has been
sharply criticized. A repeated objection has been that abrogation of
the doctrine gives the courts unrestrained law-making authority in
an area that is realistically and, in some cases, constitutionally, a
question best left to the legislature. 2 The majority of states, on the
other hand, adhere to the traditional view that a finding of state
action is still the necessary threshold which must be met before
any state or federal constitutional analysis of the underlying issues
can be triggered. How far a particular court is willing to go in order
to find the presence of state action is, of course, another matter.93
91. In State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed, Princeton
University v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982), the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
state constitutional guarantees would be available without a finding of state action against
"unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of the private entities that have
otherwise assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the individual exercise of such
freedoms because of the public use of their property." Id. 423 A.2d at 628. Likewise, (and
with similar restraint), the Supreme Court of Washington extended its free speech and initiative provisions to private disputes by holding that it would first balance the nature of the
interests at stake before it would conclude they were within the scope of constitutional protection. Alderwood Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108,
116 (1981).
92. In support of the proposition that abrogation of the state action doctrine is contrary to the system of government contemplated in state constitutions and that any regulation of private shopping centers is a matter best left to the legislature, see Cologne v.
Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1210 (1984), Woodland v. Michigan v.
Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337, 357-58 (1985), SHAD Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1217, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985), Batchleder v.
Allied Stores Int'l., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590, 596 (1983) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (regulation of private relationships is a concern for the legislature and not the court), Alderwood
Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108, 120 (1981) (Dolliver, J., concurring) ("today the term 'imperial judiciary' takes on new meaning."). But see
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 627 (1980) ("Just as the legislature cannot
abridge . . . [rights . . . by enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence . . .",
quoting King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 177, 330 A.2d 1 (1974)). In Socialist
Workers, Pa._, 515 A.2d 1339 (1986), the court commented that regulation of private
property through an exercise of the state's police power was exclusively within the legislative domain. Id. 515 A.2d at 1339. See also Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of Elections, 470 Pa.
317, 368 A.2d 648 (1977)(the court may not encroach upon the power of the legislature to
make, alter or repeal laws), and Commonwealth v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 33 A. 67, 68 (1895)
where the court stated:
a written constitution marks only the degree of restraint which, to promote stable
government, the people put upon themselves . . . whatever the people have not, by
their constitution, restrained themselves from doing, they, through their representatives in the legislature, may do . . . the right of the people, through the legislature, to
enact such laws as they choose, is absolute.
Id.
93. Criteria which have been suggested to support a finding of state action include:
(1) the presence of a symbiotic or interdependent relationship between the government and a private actor, see Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
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Michigan, Connecticut, New York and, as a result of Socialist
Workers, Pennsylvania have held that their constitutions serve
only as a restraint upon government and do not reach private conduct. 9 In adopting this view, some have concluded that the result
is mandated by the original intent of the Framers of their constitutions.9 5 The persuasiveness of this argument has not met with the
satisfaction of some judges who, like Justice Marshall, have recognized that a constitution is a living document "intended to endure
for ages to come and adapt itself to the crises of human affairs."9 "
Problems of constitutional interpretation being what they are,
however, at least one court has been candid in its reason for declin(1961), (2) a sufficiently close nexus between a regulated private entity and the state
so as to make action taken by that entity the equivalent of action taken by the state
see, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),and (3) where the private actor
has assumed a public function so as to become an arm of the state for constitutional
purposes, see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1945). All of these tests were
considered by the court in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615, 619-22 (1980),
which reached the conclusion that Princeton University was not a state actor for first
amendment purposes. In Schmid, the majority rejected the notion that Princeton's
resort to the state trespass statute to enforce its right to possess and protect its property supplied the necessary element to support a finding of state action. Id. 423 A.2d
at 621. But cf. Shelley v. Kramer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948)(resort to judicial enforcement of a
racially restrictive covenant in a deed held to constitute state action). Justice Pashman, however, although concurring in the result, was of the opposite opinion, fearful
of the possible effect abandonment of the state action doctrine would have. 423 A.2d
at 635. Similarly, in Socialist Workers v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 355 Pa.
Super. 493, 485 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1984), the superior court concluded that none of these
tests could support a finding that South Hills Village had become clothed with the
authority of the state for constitutional purposes.
94. See Socialist Workers, Pa. , 515 A.2d 1331, 1334-35 (1986), Cologne v.
Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1984), Woodland v. Michigan
Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337, 345 (1985), and SHAD Alliance v. Smith
Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
95. See Socialist Workers, Pa. -, 515 A.2d 1331, 1335-36 (1986) (drafters contemplated that civil law would govern the relations between private individuals), SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1215, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1985)(drafters intended the state constitution to govern rights of individuals with respect
to government and not each other), and Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469
A.2d 1201, 1208 (1984)(concern which led to the adoption of the Connecticut Declaration of
Rights was the protection of individual freedom against governmental intrusion).
96. See Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201, 1210
(1984)(Peters, J., dissenting)(The intent of the Framers is indeterminate and cannot override the language of the constitution. Id. 469 A.2d at 1217). See also SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y. 2d 496, 488 N.E. 2d 1211, 1219, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985)(Wachtler, C.J. dissenting)("I do not dispute that the history of a constitutional provision is important . . . [but] . . . [i]t is largely because of the willingness of the courts to interpret
such constitutional provisions in light of changing conditions that our freedoms have remained intact and our Constitutions have survived for so long". Id. 488 N.E.2d at 1221). See
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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ing to address the issue."
As if to allay any fear that Pennsylvania would ever move in the
direction of an expansive reading of the state constitution, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Socialist Workers undertook a review of the Pennsylvania Constitution's history and origin."8 It
found that its purpose was to create a government and to define
the scope of its powers. 99 Whatever powers had not been given up
by the people when the Commonwealth was created remained
vested in them.100 Because of this, the resolution of private disputes is forever outside the constitution, since it acts only as a limitation upon the power of government. Private litigants must find a
solution to their disputes within the framework of the common and
statutory law of the state. 01
In considering the facts presented by the Socialist Workers
Party and South Hills Village, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found that nothing in the common law had given anyone the general right to enter upon privately owned property.10 2 The rights of
a property owner and his invitee are governed both by common
law principles and by the scope of the invitation such property
owner extends the to a licensee with respect to entrance upon his
property.10 3 In Socialist Workers, the court found that the owners
of South Hills Village had extended an invitation to the public to
97. In State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981), the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[tihis Court could ... interpret our State Constitution to protect
conduct similar to that of defendant without infringing on any federally protected right of
the owners of private shopping centers. . . however, we are not so disposed." Id. 273 S.E.2d
at 712 (citations omitted).
98. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1334-35.
99. Id. at 1334.
100. Id. at 1334-35. See also PA. CONST. art. I, §25 which reads: "To guard against
transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in
this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain
inviolate."
101. 515 A.2d at 1335-36.
102. Id. at 1336. In Hobbs v. Geiss, 13 Serg. & Rawle 417, 418 (1826), Justice Duncan
first described the law of trespass in Pennsylvania: "Our law holds even the uninclosed [sic]
property of everyone in such respect and so sacred that no man can set foot upon his neighbor's land, without his leave: if he does, he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all.
If he will tread on his neighbor's ground, he must justify it by law . . . [a]nd if leave was
given to enter . . . [and] . . . he has abused it, . . . [he] . . . is a trespasser ab initio [.J"
103. See Kopka v. Bell Telephone of Pa., 371 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232, 235 (1952) (one

who directs another to do an act which amounts to trespass of another's land is liable as if
he himself were a trespasser); and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376,
379 (1970) (owner of a business establishment has a right to order an invitee from his premises and remove him by force if necessary since the invitee's conduct may exceed the scope
of his license and make him a trespasser).
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enter its doors for the purpose of doing business."0 ' In recognizing
the limited scope of the invitation, the court noted that South
Hills Village had maintained a uniform, exclusionary policy against
political solicitation. 10 5 The court apparently considered this an
important factor against finding that the mall had been held open
as a public forum. The court did caution, however, that this kind
of policy would not always protect a private property owner if such
owner were found to have opened his doors arbitrarily to some political groups whose opinions he favored while excluding all
others.'" The court did not consider the question of how, and
upon what authority, it could compel a private property owner to
open his property in order to give equal time to the expression of
political ideas that were contrary to his own.
Although Pennsylvania has now clearly chosen to interpret its
constitution so as to preclude its application to private action, it
cannot be said that this comes without some degree of surprise,
especially in light of the supreme court's earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Tate. 0 7 A cursory reading of the language used by
the court in Tate suggested that it too, like California, was about
to embark upon an expansive reading of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This suggestion comes from the tone of the opinion itself,
which quotes often from the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Pruneyard.
The factual setting of Tate involved the privately owned campus
of Muhlenberg College located in Allentown, Pennsylvania.0 8
Sometime during the early spring of 1976, the Board of Associates
of Muhlenberg College sponsored a symposium featuring then
F.B.I. Director Clarence Kelley as its guest speaker.' 0 9 The symposium was advertised locally as being open to the public." 0 The appellants, members of an anti-war organization, distributed leaflets
on the campus protesting Mr. Kelley's refusal to open certain F.B.I
files to them under the Freedom of Information Act."' They did
104. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1336.
105. Id. at 1337.
106. Id. at 1337 & n.5.
107. Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 432 A.2d 1382 (1981).
108. Id. 432 A.2d at 1384. For treatment of a similar issue in New Jersey involving a
privately owned university campus, see State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980),
appeal dismissed, Princeton University v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982), discussed supra at
notes 91-93 and infra at note 117.
109. 432 A.2d at 1384.
110. Id. at 1384.
111. Id.
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not engage in any disorderly conduct or attempt to enter any college buildings, but were found instead to have acted at all times in
a peaceful and non-violent manner."'2 Nonetheless, upon their refusal to leave the campus, they were arrested and charged with defiant trespass." 3 As a defense to their arrest, the appellants maintained that the outdoor grounds of the college were open to the
public and that they had complied with all "lawful" conditions required for their presence there, even though they had not sought a
permit from the college to distribute their literature on the day of
the symposium. 14
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the grant of an
on-campus solicitation permit was not governed under any articulated standards of the college but was instead issued at the arbitrary discretion of administration officials."' The court reasoned
that under these circumstances the college could not invoke the
power of the state to enforce property rights that were governed by
a private, but standardless, permit policy.1' 6 The court thereupon
proceeded to balance the right of Muhlenberg College to protect
and possess its property against the free speech rights of the appellants.1 17 Upon finding that the balance was to be struck in favor of
speech, the court reversed their convictions." 8
It is unclear what role the presence of state action played in the
reasoning of the court in Tate before it resorted to a constitutional
balancing of the interests test. If state action was present, then the
source from which it emanated is unclear since the court did not
112. Id. at 1385.
113. Id. at 1386.
114. Id. The Pennsylvania criminal trespass statute states that it shall be a defense to
prosecution if the accused can show that "the premises were at the time open to members of
the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises." 18 PA. C.S. § 3503(c)(2).
115. 432 A.2d at 1387, 1391.
116. Id. at 1391.
117. Id. A balancing approach was also used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980). There, the court considered the right to
engage in free speech on the privately owned campus of Princeton University. The court
reasoned that any balancing of the interests involved must consider (1) the nature, purpose
and use of the property, (2) the nature of the public's invitation to use the property, and (3)
the nature of the expressional activity in relation to the public and private use of the property. Id. 423 A.2d at 630. Similarly, in Alderwood Associates v. Washington Envtl. Council,
96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981), the court said it would take into account (1) the
nature of the property, (2) the nature of the expressive activity sought to be engaged in, and
(3) the potential for reasonable regulation in arriving at any constitutional balance of the
interests at stake. Id. 635 P.2d at 116.
118. 432 A.2d at 1390.
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specifically address the matter. On the other hand, if the court was
indeed adopting the rationale of Pruneyard, then no finding of
state action would have been necessary and the court would have
no reason to consider the issue.
Three alternatives suggest that the state action requirement may
have been implicitly met. First, the court may have been satisfied
to view the invocation of the power of the state by an otherwise
private actor as sufficient to supply the state action necessary for a
constitutional analysis. ' e Second, the court may have stretched to
find a nexus between the government and the college.120 Finally,
the court may have concluded that the symposium was held open
in such a manner as to make the otherwise private college an arm
of the state for constitutional purposes under the public function
doctrine.12 ' Unfortunately, the court did not clearly indicate which
of these alternatives supplied the element of state action, or
whether any of these alternatives were necessary at all in light of
Pruneyard.
After Tate was decided, the superior court was presented with
two opportunities to interpret its meaning. When Socialist Workers was first presented on appeal, the superior court reasoned that
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must have put Muhlenberg
College on a sliding scale somewhere between the state and a
purely private actor, and then found the college to be closer to the
former. 1 22 In distinguishing Tate from the facts presented in Socialist Workers, the court noted that, unlike South Hills Village,
Muhlenberg College had held itself out as a community center, had
permitted the use of its facilities by the public, and had, in sponsoring the symposium, created a situation ripe for political debate. 23 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania later sanctioned this
distinction when it concluded that although South Hills Village
may have fulfilled many of the functions associated with the tradi119. See id. at 1389, 1391. Cf. Shelley v. Kramer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948) and the discussion
supra at note 93.
120. The court found that Muhlenberg College maintained a United States Post Office, a public cafeteria and a sales booth for tickets to public events on the campus. Also
located there was a federal book depository library which was required to be open to the
public. Id. at 1386.
121. See id. at 1390. For a discussion of the public function doctrine, see generally
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 502-08 (2nd ed. 1983). See also Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1945) and the accompanying discussion supra at note 48.
122. Socialist Workers v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 493, 485 A.2d
1, 7 (1984).
123. Id. 485 A.2d at 7.
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tional town marketplace, it was not the legal equivalent of a public
forum. 24 Unlike a university whose stock in trade is the exchange
of ideas, the trade associated with a shopping center is the sale of
goods. In another case, the superior court stated that Tate had
done nothing to alter the common law of property in
5
Pennsylvania.1
In Socialist Workers, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said
nothing to indicate that Tate had been incorrectly decided. Ostensibly, the court did not attempt to overrule either its decision in
Tate or the basis for it. The court simply stated that Tate was the
limiting rationale for applying the constitution to property held
private in name, but used in fact as a public forum. 2 6 Thus, the
court has reserved to it the authority to find that a privately
owned university campus can, under some circumstances, be found
to be a public forum while the open walkways of a commercial
shopping center cannot.
As the Socialist Workers decision as well as other decisions discussed in the notes indicate, a resolution of the conflict between
constitutionally recognized rights of free expression and the common law rights of a private property owner, within the context of a
modern shopping center, can be approached using several different
legal theories. In resorting to a constitutional analysis of the problem, we are confronted with either determining, on a case by case
basis, at what point privately owned property becomes a de facto
public forum or else abandoning the state action doctrine which
has heretofore prevented the application of the constitution to otherwise private conduct. Employing the use of common law property principles, however, neatly avoids having to address questions
124. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1336-37.
125. Crozer Chester Medical Center v. May, Pa. Super. -,
506 A.2d 1377, 1381
(1986). In Crozer, a group of pro-life demonstrators appealed an injunction enjoining them
from passing out anti-abortion literature and picketing on a private road located in the
Crozer Chester Medical Center complex. The road led to a facility leased to a private corporation known as the Reproductive Health and Counseling Center. The counseling center, in
addition to providing reproductive health services, performed first trimester abortions. Id.
506 A.2d at 1378. In reliance on its reasoning used earlier in the Socialist Workers appeal,
the superior court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution conferred no greater rights of
free speech upon its citizenry than that already guaranteed by the first amendment to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 1381. Furthermore, the medical center did not meet any
of the tests necessary to support a finding of state action. Id. at 1381-82. The court reasoned
that the nature of the hospital's invitation to the public was one limited to engaging in
business and not inviting a discussion of the issues of the day. Id. at 1382. The court thereupon affirmed the injunctign issued by the court below. Id. at 1383.
126. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1336.
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that probe the very foundation and meaning of a constitution in
today's society. If the abandonment of the state action doctrine
would mean that the constitution were held to apply to all forms of
private conduct, the questions raised would be more numerous and
perhaps more troublesome than the ones answered. If Tate was
ever indicative of even the slightest intention that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania was getting ready to throw open a box of
judicially created wonders into Pennsylvania law, then Socialist
Workers was meant to shut the lid. Nevertheless, Tate is still good
27
law, whatever the juridical basis is for the "limiting rationale"'
that would allow the court to put constitutional restraints on the
right of a property owner to exclude others from privately owned
land.
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